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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JESUS SALVADOR RAMOS CORNEJO,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 45046
Ada County Case No. CR01-16-39808

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Jesus Salvador Ramos Cornejo (hereinafter “Ramos”) failed to show that the district
court abused its sentencing discretion when it sentenced him to eight years with four years
determinate upon his conviction for aggravated battery?
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ARGUMENT
Ramos Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
The victim, L.T., reported that Ramos offered her a ride to work, which she accepted.

(PSI, p. 4. 1) Ramos gave her an unknown drug, took her to a shed, and there sexually assaulted
her. (PSI, p. 4.) During the course of the assault Ramos choked L.T. with his hands and with her
employment lanyard. (PSI, pp. 4-5.)
The state charged Ramos with rape and delivery of a controlled substance. (R., pp. 3031.) Pursuant to a plea agreement the state reduced the rape charge to aggravated battery and
dismissed the delivery charge and Ramos pled guilty to the amended charge. (Tr., p. 5, Ls. 1522; p. 10, L. 18 – p. 11, L. 14; p. 15, L. 21 – p. 17, L. 5; R., pp. 50-64.) The district court
imposed a sentence of eight years with four years determinate. (Tr., p. 40, Ls. 14-18; R., pp. 7173.)
On appeal Ramos argues the district court imposed an excessive sentence because it
“should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment, including probation, in light of the
mitigating factors, including his family support, work history, and acceptance of responsibility.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3.) Application of the law to the district court’s factual findings shows this
argument to be without merit.

B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering

the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007)
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(citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144
Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the
defendant's probable term of confinement. Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d
552 (1999)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d
614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).
When considering whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion, “this Court
considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with the legal standards applicable; and (3) whether the trial court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”
State v. Fisher, 162 Idaho 465, 398 P.3d 839, 842 (2017) (quoting State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,
834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011)).

C.

Ramos Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met his burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release him on parole is
exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be
the period of actual incarceration. Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391. To establish that
the sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the
sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. The “primary
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objective” of sentencing is “the protection of society.” State v. Jimenez, 160 Idaho 540, 544, 376
P.3d 744, 748 (2016).
The district court applied the correct legal standards regarding its sentencing discretion.
(Tr., p. 38, Ls. 9-12.) It also applied the statutory factors regarding suspending a sentence and
ordering probation. (Tr., p. 38, Ls. 13-18 (citing I.C. § 19-2521).) The district court found an
undue risk that Ramos would commit another crime during probation; that Ramos had a history
of criminal offenses; that he was in need of treatment, and that the treatment should happen in
custody; that a lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime; that the sentence
would provide punishment and specific and general deterrence; and that Ramos was a multiple
offender. (Tr., p. 38, L. 19 – p. 40, L. 13.) Because the district court applied the correct legal
standards and because its factual findings support the sentence imposed, the district court did not
abuse its discretion.
Ramos’s argument that mitigating factors show the district court abused its discretion
does not withstand analysis. The first mitigator, family support (Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-4), was
specifically considered by the district court (Tr., p. 37, L. 18 – p. 38, L. 8). The district court
determined that although the expressions of support were a positive factor, this was offset by
Ramos’s claim that frustration over family difficulties was a contributing factor to his
commission of the crime. (Tr., p. 37, L. 18 – p. 38, L. 8.) Ramos has not shown that the district
court “failed to adequately consider his family support when imposing sentence.” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 4.)
The second factor Ramos claims was mitigating was his employability. (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 4-5.) The 37-year-old Ramos reported that he had been employed in 2014 and 2015
and for two months in 2016. (PSI, pp. 2, 13-14.) He admitted “some problems” in maintaining
4

long-term stable employment in the past. (PSI, p. 14.) Although not specifically cited, Ramos’s
employment history may have been considered in the district court’s factual finding that Ramos
was not a career criminal. (Tr., p. 40, Ls. 8-9.) Ramos has shown no abuse of discretion for
inadequate consideration of his employability.
The final factor cited by Ramos is his expression of remorse. (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
While it is nice that Ramos has expressed remorse, the psychosexual evaluation classified him as
“a high risk to reoffend within the next five to ten years as compared to other sexual offenders.”
(PSI, p. 56.) Ramos has failed to show the district court failed to give his expressions of remorse
adequate consideration.
The district court applied the correct legal standards and its factual findings support its
sentence. Ramos has failed to show an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 31st day of August, 2017.

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 31st day of August, 2017, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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